

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ CABLE  
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CLASSIFICATION: 1113

Order: ACTION: ALL ARA DIPLOMATIC POSTS

ARA

Info: INFO: By pouch to USNH New York; POLAD CINCLANT; POLAD CINCLANT; USRO Paris

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At special closed session COAS/OC December 17 Deputy Under Secretary

Johnson made informal, off-the-record report on status NY talks with Soviets

over Cuban crisis. Following are highlights. ~~ASST~~

asking ~~Protocol~~ protocol

1. Soviets started out ~~requesting agreement or other formal document~~

between US-USSR-Cuba and adhered to by other OAS members calling for endorse-

ment Castro's five points and ~~QUOTE~~ normalization ~~UNQUOTE~~ relations rest of

hemisphere with Cuba. They insisted ground inspection in Cuba should be

reciprocated by inspection US and other Caribbean countries.

2. US has been guided in negotiations by these principles: (a)

until terms Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange relating inspection in Cuba and future

further assurances

~~safe~~ safeguards are met question/non-invasion/~~pledge~~ does not arise; (b)

aggressive acts Castro regime matter great concern all American Republics

and any agreement must also cover this problem; (c) we have not and do not

without prior consultation with them nor

intend discuss any ~~commitment~~ involving other OAS members/~~or~~ affecting/Rio

assurances

Treaty obligations; (d) on nature non-invasion/~~pledge~~ we cannot go beyond

President's statement Nov 20 news conference; (e) we avoiding any agreement

recognize have valid

which would/~~give~~ Soviets/~~basis for claiming~~ right to voice in hemispheric

affairs.

3. Kennedy-

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3. Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange covered offensive weapons but not Soviet ground forces in Cuba. At time we did not fully appreciate extent these forces. We hope removal offensive weapons will also result removal troops. Within framework of guiding principles we trying draw line which will facilitate their removal. Cannot report much progress.

4. After negotiations with Soviets terminated Castro problem will still remain. Cannot say this juncture what our views will be on what should be done, but we certainly will consult OARS.

5. OAS posture during this serious crisis has been major factor in achieving relatively favorable outcome.

In response questions Johnson made following additional points:

1. Basis for our seeking removal Soviet ground forces are: (a) removal offensive weapons makes their presence to defend those weapons no longer necessary; (b) removal would be helpful US-USSR relations. We desire give Soviets easy way out on removal.

2. Soviet ground forces estimated 12 to 15 thousand men in well-organized and equipped units located in special encampments of their own. We can only speculate as to role.

3. We prefer to leave door open for Soviets to withdraw troops and not make major public issue of it this time or consider measures which OAS/OC might take regarding problem. If in end troops not withdrawn, then we must consult on situation created.

4. We understand why OAS/OC might experience some sense of frustration doing nothing while negotiations with Soviets continue. Nevertheless we believe OAS/OC

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standing by for possible future action has had useful effect in NY conversations.  
If conversations not successful (and at present outlook not encouraging) COAS/CS  
may well wish consider additional action.

NOTE: Pouched by DCT

RUSK

End

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